Our enemies have skillfully adapted to fighting wars in today's media age, but for the most part we, our country, our government, has not adapted. Consider that the violent extremists have established media relations committees-these are terrorists and they have media relations committees that meet and talk about strategy, not with bullets but with words. They've proven to be highly successful at manipulating the opinion elites of the world. They plan and design their headline-grabbing attacks using every means of communication to intimidate and break the collective will of free people…They know that communications transcend borders and that a single news story handled skillfully can be as damaging to our cause and helpful to theirs as any other method of military attack. And they're doing it. They're able to act quickly. They have relatively few people. They have modest resources compared to the vast and expensive bureaucracies of Western governments. Our federal government is really only beginning to adapt our operations to the 21st Manar voluntarily stopped broadcasting several days before the ban was to take effect, a move that prevented other stations on the same satellite network from being removed from the airwaves as well.
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As regards the U.S. ban, it followed shortly thereafter. In December 2004, al
Manar was placed on an "exclusion list" by the U.S. State Department. This was followed up in March 2006 with al Manar's designation as a terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of the Treasury. 35 As a result, no one associated with the broadcaster is allowed entry to the U.S. and any U.S. company found to be doing business with al Manar will be subject to sanctions and possible prosecution. The result is al Manar is effectively prohibited from transmitting in the United States.
Although they result in the same outcomes, it's worth noting that the French and U.S. which al Jazeera said also appeared on TV screens.
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The Israeli bombing of Hizbollah's media outlets received harsh criticism from journalistic and human rights organizations. The Committee to Protect Journalists, the Abu Ghaith, and others.
-Bi-weekly electronic journals containing analyses of the conflicts in Iraq and
Afghanistan.
-Islamic scholars' and clerics' evaluations and explanations of al Qaeda's past attacks, future plans, and admonishments to others to act. These included a series of articles claiming that suicide bombings aimed at Americans are justifiable under Islamic law -Essays describing al Qaeda's war aims and assessments of how achieving these goals would benefit the Muslim umma.
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There was also media speculation that the al-Neda site was being used to direct al way that does not seriously impinge on the daily lives of its citizens. Bin
Laden's aim is to radicalize and mobilize. He is closer to achieving his goals than the West is to deterring him. 81 One of the most significant aspects of al Qaeda's post-9/11 reshaping has been the significant increase in its reliance on the Internet as a soft power tool. 82 Bin Laden's cadres had employed the Internet for communication and propaganda purposes prior to the US attacks, 83 but their use of the Internet increased exponentially thereafter.
Michael Scheuer has put this down to the loss of al Qaeda's Afghan base and the consequent dispersal of fighters, along with rapid development of the medium itself and the computers and other gadgets with which it can increasingly be accessed, and the proliferation of Internet cafes globally. 84 Indeed al Qaeda's increased virtuality after 9/11 inspired one analyst to coin the descriptor "al Qaeda 2.0" 85 
